We provide some objective foundations for a belief revision process in a situation where (i) the decision-maker's initial probabilistic knowledge is imprecise and characterized by the core of a belief function, (ii) expected new data are themselves consistent with a belief function with known focal sets and (iii) the revision process is based on belief function combination. We study the properties of the information value for such a revising in the Gilboa±Schmeidler multi-prior model. Ó
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who knows that he will improve his imprecise statistical knowledge by getting some new data. This improvement will enable him to reduce the ambiguity he faces. In other words if his initial knowledge consists of a family of probability distributions, then the new data will conduct him to revise his belief and replace this family by a smaller one. This work is closely linked to [2] where a notion of information structure www.elsevier.com/locate/ijar based on the idea of ambiguity being reduced is de®ned, and where the information value of such a process is obtained by considering the Gilboa± Schmeidler [6] Max Min Expected Utility Model. However, while in [2] the consistency of the subjective anticipations of the decision-maker about the future reduction in ambiguity was studied, no objective foundations for this process was proposed. The purpose of the present paper is to oer such an objective explanation.
The idea is the following. Initially, the decision-maker is endowed with a belief function f and considers as possible the family of probability distributions which lie in the core of f. The new statistical data he is going to receive is a belief function g compatible with f. Given this new belief function g, the decision-maker will combine his initial family coref with the new family coreg and restrict his attention to coref coreg since the statistical reality, i.e, the true probability distribution, necessarily belongs to the two families. The decision-maker does not know in advance which belief function he will receive. Indeed, were we to assume the contrary, he could already revise his knowledge. Yet, throughout this paper, we make the central assumption that the decisionmaker knows the possible focal events of the future belief function. Thus he anticipates that he can receive any belief function g with focal events in a given set, which is compatible with f i.e. such that coref coreg T YX The following two examples aim at illustrating our purpose. Example 1.1 @edpted from [8] ). Assume that a poll institute 1 organizes a study on how a representative sample will vote for a next election in two months. Let S faY bY cY dY eg be the set of candidates. Voters' opinions, today, are not ®rmly established, so voters are authorized to point only a subset e of that contains the name of the candidate they will vote for. (In order to avoid unnecessary technical complications, we assume that e must be non-empty.) Therefore institute 1 will get a belief function f, with the help of the induced objective proportions mA for any e belonging to 2 S X Suppose now that institute 1 learns that a few days before the actual vote, the results of a new survey performed on a similar representative sample by a poll institute 2 will be published, where the voters will be asked whether they will vote for a candidate in a given non-empty coalition B P 2 S or in the opposite non-empty coalition BX (For the same reasons as above, we assume that the choice of f or B is compulsory.) Then institute 1 faces a kind of situation investigated in this paper, since it only knows the possible focal elements (here f or B ) of the future belief function g, and clearly the assumption of representative samples guarantees the compatibility of f and g.
In Example 1.2 we consider a more general situation in the sense that the future possible focal elements will no longer form a partition of the set of states of nature. Example 1.2 @edpted from [7] ). Let us consider a population of patients, each patient being in one of four exclusive states of health: H healthy, D 1 to suffer from disease 1, D À 2 to suffer from a mild form of disease 2, D Let us mention that dealing here only with belief functions (instead of, say, with convex capacities) presents several advantages. First it ®ts with numerous practical situations of imprecise but exact data. Second it considerably facilitates the derivation of clear-cut results essentially through the non-negativity of the M obius inverse and the resulting simple description of the core of such capacities, a well-known result since Dempster's seminal paper [5] .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set the framework of the process we consider. In Section 3 we de®ne the value of information. In Section 4 we study the consistency requirement for these``Ambiguity Reducing Structures''. In Section 5, we compare structures in terms of informativeness.
De®nition of the ambiguity reducing structures
We consider S a ®nite set of states of the world and 2
S the algebra of events of S. The decision-maker has an initial statistical knowledge coref with f a belief function de®ned on 2 S and m f its M obius transform.
De®nition 2.1. Two belief functions f and g on 2 S are said to be compatible if coref coreg T YX Since the decision-maker is concerned with the real underlying probability distribution and since we suppose that the statistical data he receives is only imprecise but never wrong (i.e. the real underlying statistical situation always belongs to the family of probability distribution that sums up the knowledge of the decision-maker), we only restrict our attention to belief functions which are compatible. (For an extensive study of the combination of two compatible belief functions, see [4] .) De®nition 2.2. We call Suppf the smallest (for set inclusion) E S such that f E 1.
For a belief function, there is no problem of existence and uniqueness of such an event.
De®nition 2.3. We denote Uf fE Sam f E b 0g the set of focal events for the belief function f X Obviously we have that Suppf EPUf E. Let us consider R 2 S .
De®nition 2.4. We denote BF R the set of belief functions g such that Ug RX
From now on we assume that the decision-maker knows that the focal events of the belief function g he will receive will all belong to RX De®nition 2.5. We denote BF RY f the set of belief functions in BF R which are compatible with f.
This de®nition also stands for probability distributions. In that case, we have BF RY p fg P BF Rap P coreggX As pointed out in Section 1, the following lemma, a central result of Dempster [5] (see also a generalization in [3] to general capacities), will be of great help in several proofs below.
Lemma 2.1. vet f e elief funtion on SY 2 S with w oius inverse m f nd Uf s set of fol elements, nd let p e proility mesure on SY 2 S . hen, the following propositions re equivlent:
It is also the case for the following lemma due to [4] .
Lemma 2.2. vet f nd g e two elief funtionsD then the following two ssertions re equivlentX (i) he elief funtions f nd g re omptileF
Let us add that, due to space constraints, we have only tried to emphasize the main points of the proofs of the results below, without always developing all details. Proof. Obvious (remind that g P BF RY f i Wp P coref coreg and g P BF R). Ã In terms of anticipations, this means that the belief functions g the decisionmaker believes possible given f and R are the belief functions that he believes possible to receive given R and a possible underlying probability distribution p. Proposition 2.2. por ll elief funtions f, sets R nd g P BF RY f Y coref coreg fp P coref ag P BF RY pg.
Proof. Obvious (this result is a mere restatement of De®nitions 1 and 5). Ã
Let us study now the decision-maker's anticipations about how he will revise his knowledge. De®nition 2.6. We denote respectively Ff and Ff Y g the family of probability distributions in coref and coref coreg.
Necessarily Ff Y g Ff which can be interpreted as a reduction of ambiguity. 1 Given f and R, a decision-maker can anticipate how his beliefs may evolve after he will get new data. De®nition 2.7. We call the set f Ã R fFf Y gag P BF RY f g an Ambiguity Reducing Structure.
If there is no such Ff Y g P f Ã RY this means that the decision-maker anticipates that he will no longer consider pas possible whatever the data he receives.
De®nition 2.8. For any R 2 S and i P 2 S , we denote RE fF P 2 S aF H E with H P RgX
The next proposition gives the condition which ensures that the decisionmaker can make some anticipations.
Proposition 2.4. he two propositions re equivlent
. We show the implication by proving that if (ii) does not stand, then it is also the case for (i). Thus take an E P Uf such that RE fYgX It implies that Vg P BF RY Vp P coregY pE 0 while
Since in this paper we assume that BF RY f is non-empty, the above condition (ii) holds throughout the paper.
The following proposition shows an important consistency condition about the decision-maker's anticipations. Proposition 2.5. he two propositions re equivlent
Let us show that if (ii) does not stand, then it is also the case for (i). Suppose Ws P Suppf such that s T P EPRSuppf EX Then Wp P Ff such that ps b 0X BF RY p Y since Vg P BF RY s T P SuppgX (ii) A (i). Let us take a p P Ff . Consider a function u X Suppf 3 R such that Vs P Suppf Y s P usX De®ne g u P BF R by m gu E sPSuppf ausE psX We obtain g u P BF RY p. Ã
We can expect (ii) to be an important consistency condition. For instance, consider on the contrary that (ii) does not hold. Then there exists a p such that BF RY p Y and, according to Proposition 2.3, this means that the decisionmaker already knows that whatever g he will receive, he will not consider p as possible any more. Logically, he could eliminate ex ante p in his initial knowledge coref .
One may wonder what role R plays. The following results show that we can restrict our attention to RSuppf X Proposition 2.6. por ll elief funtions f nd sets RY f Ã R f Ã RSuppf X Proof. First let us prove that f Ã RSuppf f Ã RX For that purpose, let us consider g belonging to BF RSuppf Y f Y and de®ne a new belief function g u P BF RY f such that Ff Y g u Ff Y gX Thus, let u be a mapping E P RSuppf 3 uE P R such that uE Suppf E, the existence of such a mapping is trivial from the de®nition of RSuppf X Furthermore, it is straightforward that u is injective. Hence let g u be the set-function on SY 2 S whose M obius inverse is de®ned by m g u F m g u À1 F Y VF P 2 S X That g u is a belief function with support contained in R, can be readily checked. It remains to prove that Ff Y g u Ff Y gX First prove Ff Y g u Ff Y gX Let p P coref coreg u X That p will also belong to coreg will result through (iii) of the Lemma 2.1 from the fact that Vs P SupppY VF P RY one obtains F fsg is equivalent to u À1 F s f gX The converse inclusion Ff Y g u Ff Y g, will be similarly obtained through Lemma 2.1, taking into account the fact that if p P Ff Y g then Vs P SupppY VE P RSuppf , one obtains E fsg is equivalent to uE fsgY hence m gu uE m g E will allow to conclude.
Conversely let us prove that f Ã R f Ã RSuppf X For that purpose, let us consider g belonging to BF RY f Y and de®ne a new belief function g
S whose M obius inverse m g H is de®ned by
First it is easy to show that g P BF RY f entails that Vp P Ff Y g and VF P UgY F Suppp T Y hence F Suppf T Y, and therefore: F Suppf T YY VF P UgX This will entail that m g H Y 0Y and that g H is actually a belief function whose support is contained in RSuppf X It remains to prove that 
The decision-maker is sure that there is a zero probability that the real state of the world lies outside of Suppf , so he does not bother about these states.
Proposition 2.7. he two propositions re equivlent:
Let us show that if (ii) does not hold, then it is also the case for (i). If (ii) does not hold, then either there exists a sÃ P Suppf , a p P Ff Y E and p in RSuppf such that psÃ b 0Y E T F and sÃ P E F Y or EPRSuppf E & Suppf and in this case, according to Proposition 2.5, there exists a p P Ff such that BF RSuppf Y p YX Let us consider the ®rst case. Then, there exists two functions u E and u F X Suppf 3 RSuppf such that Vs P Suppf Y s P u E s and s P u F s with u E sÃ E, u F sÃ F and u E s u F s otherwise. De®ne g u i P BF RSuppf by m gu i H sPSuppf au i sH ps for i EY F . Then one can check that g u E T g u F and
Let us consider p P Ff X Consider g p de®ned by m gp E sPE ps if E P RSuppf Y 0 otherwise. (ii) implies that g u is a belief function in BF RSuppf Y pX Take a g P BF RSuppf Y pX Suppose that g T g u so that there exists a E P RSuppf such that m g E T m gu E.
Suppose for instance m g E`m gu EX By de®nition of BF RSuppf
Then with (ii) and by de®nition of g u , this implies that gE m g E`g u E m gu E pE and
which contradicts the fact that p P coreg. If m g E`m gu E the contradiction comes directly from gE m g E b g u E m gu E pEX Ã Condition (ii) is quite strong and corresponds to the particular case we have examined in the examples. The next proposition shows that there exists some weaker condition that still give some interesting property for the emiguity eduing trutures. Proposition 2.8. he first two propositions re equivlent nd they imply the third one:
iii). Let us show that if (iii) does not hold, then it is also the case for (ii). If (iii) does not hold then we are in one of the following situations:
RE is not a partition of i for all i and (a) either WE P UF such that HPRE H & E which implies 
This partitional case is similar to the usual information structures conceived as partitions of 2 . Example 1.2 was a case were condition (iii) is satis®ed. This result shows that in general, f Ã R is not a partition of Ff and that the ambiguity reduction process can be itself quite fuzzy.
The information value of an ambiguity reducing structure
We consider the Max min EU with multi-prior model of [6] in order to analyse the value of information. Let us introduce this model of preference formally. The decision-maker is choosing between acts which are mappings from S into a set of outcomes X . We suppose that the decision-maker has a utility function U de®ned on X and that his preference on the set of acts relies on a family Ff of probability distributions on S, with f his initial belief function, through the functional
Without access to supplementary statistical data, the timing of decision and resolution of uncertainty is shown in Fig. 1 .
Let us denote aÃ as the optimal choice of the decision-maker when he has to choose in an opportunity set A and V AY f max aPA V f a V f aÃ the optimal value he can get.
However, after he receives a g P BF RY f , the decision-maker chooses according to his``revised'' preference V f g Á. The timing of decision and resolution of uncertainty is shown in Fig. 2 .
Let us denote a Ã g his optimal choice after he receives the belief function g and V AY f g max aPA V f g a V f g a Ã g the optimal value he gets conditionally on g. How does the decision-maker value ex ante the whole process of choosing in A after getting new statistical data? For that, we have to determine how the decision-maker evaluates ex ante the fact of getting V AY f g conditionally on g. Since the decision-maker's anticipations about the g's P BF RY f he may receive are totally uncertain, it seems natural to consider the following anticipated value:
We will say that there is a positive value of information for the structure f Ã R if the anticipated value V AY f Y R is greater than the value V AY f he would get by ignoring his information possibilities. 
Since VE P Uf Y RE T fYgY hence BF RY f T Y and the information value is well de®ned.
The next results con®rm the intuition that the reduction of ambiguity is positive for the decision-maker, i.e., the information value is always positive.
Consistent ambiguity reducing structure
We noted that Proposition 2.5 was about some logical consistency between the anticipation and the initial knowledge. Another way to introduce this idea of consistency between the anticipation and the initial knowledge is to consider the following notion of xeutrlity with respet to initil knowledge. Proposition 4.1. he three propositions re equivlent:
EPRSuppf E Suppf Y (iii) f Ã R stisfies xeutrlity with respet to the initil knowledge Ff X Proof. Proposition 2.5 stated the equivalence between (i) and (ii).
(
Neutrality with respect to the initial knowledge captures the idea that the anticipation in an ambiguity reducing structure should not allow the decisionmaker to improve ex ante his knowledge.
Let us take now a decision theoretic point of view. A positive value of information captures the decision theorists intuition that information is always valuable because it permits to adapt more accurately one's choice. Yet if the choice set is reduced to a unique act, there is no possibility of adjusting more accurately one's choice and there should be a null value of information whatever is the information structure. If on the contrary, we ®nd a positive value of information, it is the kind of``pure'' value of information that indicates that the initial knowledge does not capture all the information already available in the information structure. What is the condition that ensures that we will not ®nd a pure value of information? The following theorem shows that the consistency conditions examined above are the right conditions. Theorem 4.1. he two propositions re equivlent:
(i) f Ã R stisfies xeutrlity with respet to the initil knowledge Ff
(ii) A i. Let us show that if (i) does not stand, then it is also the case for (ii). By Proposition 4.1, there is a s P Suppf n EPRSuppf E. Consider A fag with such that U as a and VsÃ T sU asÃ bY a`b. (We assume the non-degeneracy of in order to allow the construction of such an act .) Then, since Vp P Ff YgPf ÃR Ff Y gY ps 0 it implies that E p U a V AY f Y R b. On the other hand, since Wp P Ff such that ps b 0Y V AY f `b and thus VIAY f Y R b 0X Ã
Comparing ambiguity reducing structures
It is interesting to be able to compare ambiguity reducing structures in terms of informativeness. One way to do that, is to compare their respective values of information. Let us adapt the classical de®nition of [1] .
Our purpose is to ®nd some equivalent comparative properties of the ambiguity reducing structures. Let us introduce the following two de®nitions.
The following result gives the complete characterization of the partial ordering for the ambiguity reducing structures.
Theorem 5.1. he three propositions re equivlent:
Proof. (i) A (iii). Let us show that if (iii) does not hold, then it is also the case for (i). Then, there exists E P Uf and F P R such that VG P R Ã Y E F is not included in E GX First,we show that there exists a g P BF RY f such that Vg Ã P BF R Ã Y f Y Ff Y g is not included in Ff Y g Ã X There exists a function u X Uf 3 R such that VH P Uf Y H uH T YY uH F if H E F T YX De®ne g P BF RY f by VG P R m g G H PUf auH G m f H X (Indeed, one can check that g is compatible with f.) Consider g Ã P BF R Ã Y f . According to Lemma 2.2, there exists a mapping b Ã X 2 S Â 2 S 3 R verifying Lemma 2.2 condition (ii). There exists a G P R Ã such that b Ã EY G b 0 and a s P S such that s P E F n E F GX Then de®ne a p P Ff Y g such that p s
Note that in the particular case where R is a partition of (see Example 1.1), the ambiguity reducing structure is more informative if and only if the partition is ®ner.
Concluding remarks
As emphasized in Section 1, in this paper we con®ne ourselves to initial imprecise probabilities situations described by belief functions, assuming moreover that ex ante the decision-maker is merely informed of the set R of possible focal events of a future compatible belief function. This allows us to derive in an easy way a simple characterization of such a compatible ambiguity reducing process (see Proposition 2.4). Furthermore this leads, in the framework of the multiple-priors model, both to con®rm the intuition of the positiveness of ambiguity reduction (see Theorem 3.1), and to obtain a neat and meaningful characterization of the partial ordering``more informative than'', in terms of ®neness of``information R''.
Assuming that ex ante information consists of a set R of possible focal elements may appear as a limitation, as can be shown by examining, for instance, some practical examples of opinion surveys. It will be the objective of a future paper to relax this assumption, the same will apply to the belief function hypothesis.
